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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
The principal issue on appeal is whether the submission 
of fraudulent legal bills for approval to the United States 
Bankruptcy Court violates the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 
S 3729. We hold the False Claims Act only prohibits 
fraudulent claims that cause economic loss to the 
government. We also hold that a r etaliatory discharge cause 
of action under 31 U.S.C. S 3730(h) requires proof that the 
employee engaged in "protected conduct" and that the 
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employer was on notice of the "distinct possibility" of False 
Claims Act litigation and retaliated against the employee. 
 
I. 
 
Charles Hutchins was one of two paralegals in the 
creditors' rights department of the New Jersey law firm of 
Wilentz, Goldman & Spitzer from Mar ch 1993 to October 
1995. On August 2, 1995, Louis T. DeLucia, a partner in 
Wilentz, Goldman & Spitzer's creditors' rights department, 
asked Hutchins to investigate certain client bills, with 
particular attention to the "high costs" of certain 
computerized research. After investigating the matter and 
discussing it with the law firm's paralegal supervisor, Marie 
Henneberry, Hutchins submitted a short memorandum to 
DeLucia stating, "I was told that the fir m has a policy 
whereby actual Westlaw and LEXIS expenses are multiplied 
by 1.5 in order to arrive at the amount the client is invoiced 
for." Hutchins also expressed concer n to Henneberry that 
paralegals were being used to perfor m secretarial tasks 
resulting in overcharging clients. 
 
On September 22, 1995, over a month after submitting 
his billing practices memorandum, Hutchins was 
summoned by firm management to a meeting to discuss his 
continued employment. Hutchins contends the lawfirm 
wanted to fire him because of his "investigation" into their 
fraudulent billing practices. Wilentz, Goldman & Spitzer 
countered they were upset over Hutchins's relationships 
with other firm employees, and wanted to discuss an 
anonymous memorandum circulated in May 1995 
containing disparaging comments about Andrew W agner, 
the other paralegal in the creditors' rights department. The 
law firm advised Hutchins that they believed he wrote the 
memorandum. After denying involvement, Hutchins wr ote a 
letter to Kim Haan, a paralegal in another department 
whom he believed was the source of the accusation, stating, 
 
       You considered my prior uses of guerilla tactics against 
       the I.R.S., my ex-wife and her attorneys as evidence 
       that I wrote the . . . [disparaging memorandum]. The 
       I.R.S. has stolen my money, locked me up in court 
       battles for a decade, ruined a relationship/marriage 
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       engagement, harassed me and filed hundreds of 
       thousands of dollars in tax liens against me. My ex- 
       wife and her attorneys used perjured testimony and 
       affidavits to induce the government courts to issue 
       restraining orders keeping me away fr om my children. 
       There just is no comparison between these 
       interferences with my money and my kids, and 
       someone propositioning a married woman in the office 
       . . . . After you've read Atlas Shrugged two or three 
       more times (I've read it five times) you may recognize 
       Rand's belief that free men have a moral duty to resist 
       abuses of government and to resist the ef forts of those 
       who misuse government agencies and gover nment 
       power for personal reasons. Her philosophy guides my 
       subtle warfare against tyrants. Its [sic] a great deal 
       more appropriate than blowing up federal buildings 
       . . . . 
 
       I suppose I would hope that if you learn anything from 
       all of this it would be not to be so quick to rush to 
       judgment about people . . . and that you would be 
       careful about what you say about people. The next 
       time you might injure someone less prepar ed to deal 
       with abuse, or the person you injure just mightfile a 
       defamation/slander lawsuit against you. 
 
Haan reported to the firm personnel manager, Anne 
Riegle, that she was "terrified" by the letter. Riegle noted 
that Haan was "visibly upset" believing that Hutchins might 
"do something to her." On Friday, September 27, 1997, the 
law firm decided to terminate Hutchins as a result of "the 
culmination of escalating problems with his superiors and 
with staff." 
 
When informed of the decision to terminate Hutchins, 
Haan asked the law firm to wait until after the weekend to 
inform him. Because she was taking the law school 
admission test that weekend, Haan explained that she was 
afraid Hutchins would attempt to disrupt her . She also 
asked to be excused from work the following Monday and 
Tuesday so that she would not be present when Hutchins 
was discharged. Wilentz, Goldman & Spitzer agreed. 
 
On Monday, October 2, 1995, Hutchins requestedfiles 
from the accounting department reflecting the law firm's 
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billing of Westlaw and LEXIS expenses. The accounting 
department denied him access. Two hours later , Hutchins 
was informed that he was fired. 
 
On October 18, 1995, Hutchins notified the United States 
Trustee by sworn affidavit that he believed Wilentz, 
Goldman & Spitzer had engaged in fraudulent and unlawful 
billing practices. He filed a pro se qui tam complaint under 
S 3729 of the False Claims Act alleging W ilentz, Goldman & 
Spitzer submitted fraudulent billing statements to the 
United States Bankruptcy Court and that the lawfirm 
violated the whistleblower provisions of the False Claims 
Act, 31 U.S.C. S 3730(h), by terminating his employment 
because of his investigation into the firm's billing practices. 
 
The District Court dismissed Hutchins's qui tam  claim 
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (b)(6),1  and granted Wilentz, 
Goldman & Spitzer summary judgment on Hutchins's 
retaliatory discharge claim.2  
 
II. 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction over Hutchins's qui 
tam and retaliatory discharge claims under 28 U.S.C. 
S 1331. We have jurisdiction over the District Court's final 
order dismissing his claims under 28 U.S.C.S 1291. We 
exercise plenary review over the District Court's grant of 
summary judgment on Hutchins's retaliatory discharge 
claim and its dismissal of his qui tam claim under Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 12 (b)(6). Liberty Lincoln-Mer cury, Inc. v. Ford Motor 
Co., 171 F.3d 818, 822 (3d Cir. 1999); Malia v. Gen. Elec. 
Co., 23 F.3d 828, 830 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 956 
(1994). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. United States ex rel. Hutchins v. W ilentz, Goldman & Spitzer, C.A. No. 
96-5988, slip. op. at *4 (D.N.J. August 4, 1998) ("Hutchins I") 
(dismissing 
qui tam claim). 
 
2. United States ex rel. Hutchins v. W ilentz, Goldman & Spitzer, C.A. No. 
96-5988, slip. op. at *15-16 (D.N.J. September 8, 1998) ("Hutchins II") 
(granting defendant summary judgment on retaliatory discharge claim). 
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III. 
 
A. 
 
The False Claims Act provides: 
 
       (a) Liability for certain acts - Any person who - 
 
       (1) knowingly presents, or causes to be pr esented, to 
       an officer or employee of the United States 
       Government or a member of the Armed For ces of the 
       United States a false or fraudulent claim for payment 
       or approval; 
 
       (2) knowingly makes, uses or causes to be made or 
       used, a false record or statement to get a false claim 
       or fraudulent claim paid or approved by the 
       Government; 
 
       (3) conspires to defraud the Government by getting a 
       false or fraudulent claim allowed or paid; 
 
       * * * 
 
       (7) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or 
       used, a false record or statement to conceal, avoid, 
       or decrease an obligation to pay or transmit money 
       or property to the Government, 
 
       is liable to the United States Government for a civil 
       penalty of not less than $5,000 and not more than 
       $10,000, plus three times the amount of damages 
       which the Government sustains because of the act of 
       that person . . . . 
 
31 U.S.C. S 3729. An action under the False Claims Act 
may be commenced in two ways. The United States 
Department of Justice may file suit to collect damages 
suffered as the result of fraudulent claims which cause 
government money to be expended from the United States 
Treasury. Alternatively, a private plaintiff may bring a qui 
tam action3 on behalf of the government to recover losses 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. In Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. 
Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 768 n.1 (2000) (inter nal citations omitted), the 
United States Supreme Court set forth the historical foundations of the 
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incurred because of fraudulent claims. 31 U.S.C. 
S 3730(b)(1). When a private plaintiff brings a qui tam 
action, the government is permitted to intervene. But the 
private plaintiff may continue his suit even if the 
government declines to intervene. 31 U.S.C.S 3730(c)(1). If 
the qui tam suit is ultimately successful, the private 
plaintiff, known as a relator, is entitled to up to 30% of the 
funds the government recovers. 31 U.S.C.S 3730(d). 
 
B. 
 
Relying on the qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act, 
Hutchins filed suit alleging that Wilentz, Goldman & 
Spitzer's submission of inflated legal bills to the United 
States Bankruptcy Court violated S 3729(a)(1) of the False 
Claims Act.4 To establish a prima facie case under the False 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
qui tam suit stating, "qui tam is short for the Latin phrase qui tam pro 
domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur, which means `who 
pursues this action on Lord the King's behalf as well as his own.' The 
phrase dates from at least the time of Blackstone." The Court further 
explained, 
 
       Qui tam actions appear to have originated ar ound the end of the 
       13th century, when private individuals who had suf fered injury 
       began bringing actions in the royal courts on both their own and 
the 
       Crown's behalf. Suit in this dual capacity was a device for getting 
       their private claims into the respected r oyal courts, which 
generally 
       entertained only matters involving the Crown's interest. 
 
Id. at 774 (internal citations omitted). 
 
The Court noted that in the 14th century, 
 
       Parliament began enacting statutes that explicitly provided for qui 
       tam suits. These were of two types: those that allowed injured 
       parties to sue in vindication of their own inter ests (as well as 
the 
       Crown's) . . . and . . . those that allowed informers to obtain a 
       portion of the penalty as a bounty for their infor mation (about 
those 
       who transgressed against the king) even if they had not suffered 
the 
       injury themselves. 
 
Id. at 775 (internal citations omitted). 
 
4. As noted, S 3729(a)(1) provides: 
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Claims Act a plaintiff must prove: (1) the defendant 
presented or caused to be presented to an agent of the 
United States a claim for payment; (2) the claim was false 
or fraudulent; (3) the defendant knew the claim was false or 
fraudulent; and (4) the United States suffer ed damages as 
a result of the false or fraudulent claim. Young-Montenay, 
Inc. v. United States, 15 F.3d 1040, 1043 (Fed. Cir. 1994) 
(quoting Miller v. United States, 550 F .2d 17, 23 (Ct. Cl. 
1977)). It is undisputed that the United States T rustee and 
the United States Bankruptcy Courts are gover nment 
agents for purposes of the False Claims Act. Additionally, it 
is clear that inflating the Westlaw and LEXIS expenses was 
unlawful under the Bankruptcy Code. 
 
The crux of the dispute is whether the submission of 
these fraudulent bills was a "false claim for payment or 
approval" that caused damage to the United States 
government. Focusing on the latter portion ofS 3729(a)(1), 
Hutchins contends that even if no government money were 
expended from the United States Tr easury in connection 
with the law firm's inflated legal bills, the submission of 
these bills for approval by the Bankruptcy Court violates 
the False Claims Act. 
 
Although not linguistically implausible, we find no 
support for this reading from the jurisprudence interpreting 
the False Claims Act. Rainwater v. United States , 356 U.S. 
590, 592 (1958) ("It seems quite clear that the objective of 
Congress was broadly to protect the funds and property of 
the Government from fraudulent claims."); United States ex 
rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, reh'g denied, 318 U.S. 
799 (1943). Nor have we been able to find any case 
establishing that a false statement to the gover nment which 
does not cause the government economic loss gives rise to 
False Claims Act liability. United States ex r el. Hopper v. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       Any person who- 
 
       (1) knowingly presents, or caused to be pr esented, to an officer 
or 
       employee of the United States Government, or a member of the 
       Armed Forces of the United States a false or fraudulent claim for 
       payment or approval . . . is liable . . . . 
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Anton, 91 F.3d 1261, 1266 (9th Cir . 1996) ("[T]he Act 
attaches liability, not to underlying fraudulent activity, but 
to the `claim for payment.' ") (quoting United States v. 
Rivera, 55 F.3d 703, 709 (1st Cir . 1995)), cert. denied, 519 
U.S. 1115 (1997). 
 
"Not all false statements made to the federal government 
are claims within the meaning of the False Claims Act." 
United States v. Greenberg, 237 F . Supp. 439, 442 (S.D.N.Y. 
1965) (citing United States v. Howell, 318 F .2d 162 (9th Cir. 
1963)). "Even under a somewhat broader definition, only 
`actions which have the purpose and effect of causing the 
government to pay out money are clearly`claims' within the 
purpose of the Act.' " United States v. Lawson, 522 F. Supp. 
746, 750 (D.N.J. 1981) (quoting United States v. Silver, 384 
F. Supp. 617, 620 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), aff 'd, 515 F.2d 505 (2d 
Cir. 1975)); see also United States v. Neifert-White Co., 390 
U.S. 228, 233 (1968) (False Claims Act reaches to "all 
fraudulent attempts to cause the Government to pay out 
sums of money."). As the Supreme Court r ecognized in 
United States v. McNinch, 356 U.S. 595, 599 (1958) (quoting 
United States v. Tieger, 234 F.2d 589, 591 (3d Cir. 1956)), 
" `The conception of a claim against the government 
normally connotes a demand for money or for some 
transfer of public property.' " In McNinch, the Supreme 
Court traced the legislative history of the False Claims Act 
stating, 
 
       The False Claims Act was originally adopted following 
       a series of sensational congressional investigations into 
       the sale of provisions and munitions to the W ar 
       Department. Testimony before Congr ess painted a 
       sordid picture of how the United States had been billed 
       for nonexistent or worthless goods, charged exorbitant 
       prices for goods delivered, and generally r obbed in 
       purchasing the necessities of war. Congr ess wanted to 
       stop this plundering of the public treasury. At the 
       same time it is equally clear that the False Claims Act 
       was not designed to reach every kind of fraud practiced 
       on the Government. 
 
Id. at 599; see also United States ex r el. Pogue v. Am. 
Healthcorp., Inc., 914 F.Supp. 1507, 1512 (M.D.Tenn. 1996) 
("The legislative history of the False Claims Act reveals that 
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it was designed to protect the Federal T reasury.") (citing S. 
Rep. No. 99-345 at 4 (1986), reprinted in  1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5266, 5269). 
 
In this regard, we believe Hutchins's r eading of the 
statute expands the False Claims Act's scope of liability to 
include actions not contemplated by Congress. His 
argument neglects the statutory definition of the term 
"claim" which provides, 
 
       For purposes of this section, "claim" includes any 
       request or demand whether under a contract or 
       otherwise, for money or property which is made to a 
       contractor, grantee, or other recipient if the United 
       States Government provides any portion of the money 
       or property which is requested or demanded, or if the 
       Government will reimburse such contractor , grantee, or 
       other recipient for any portion of the money or property 
       which is requested or demanded. 
 
31 U.S.C. S 3729(c). 
 
The False Claims Act seeks to redress fraudulent activity 
which causes economic loss to the United States 
government. As the Supreme Court held in Hess, the 
purpose of the False Claims Act "was to pr ovide for 
restitution to the government of money taken from it by 
fraud." 317 U.S. at 551. It was not intended to impose 
liability for every false statement made to the government.5 
Costner v. URS Consultants, Inc., 153 F .3d 667, 677 (8th 
Cir. 1998) ("[O]nly those actions by the claimant which have 
the purpose and effect of causing the United States to pay 
out money it is not obligated to pay, or those actions which 
intentionally deprive the United States of money it is 
lawfully due, are properly consider ed `claims' within the 
meaning of the FCA."). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Extending the False Claims Act to reach any false statement made to 
the government, regardless of any impact on the United States Treasury, 
would appear to impermissibly expand standing doctrine and essentially 
permit any plaintiff to sue on behalf of the government when false or 
misleading statements are made to any gover nment agent including the 
courts, the legislature or any law enfor cement officer. 
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For these reasons, we hold the submission of false claims 
to the United States government for appr oval which do not 
cause financial loss to the government ar e not within the 
purview of the False Claims Act. Tieger , 234 F.2d at 592 
("The provision relating to the payment or approval of a 
`claim upon or against' the Government r elates solely to the 
payment or approval of a claim for money or pr operty to 
which a right is asserted against the Government."). Unless 
these claims result in economic loss to the United States 
government, liability under the False Claims Act does not 
attach. United States v. Bornstein, 423 U.S. 303, 309 n.4 
(1976) (" `The conception of a claim against the government 
normally connotes a demand for money or for some 
transfer of public property.' ") (quoting McNinch, 356 U.S. at 
599). 
 
C. 
 
In dismissing plaintiff 's claims, the District Court stated 
the Bankruptcy Court was merely acting as an intermediary 
in approving defendant's false claims. The court noted, "[In 
most False Claims Act actions] the intermediary [to whom 
the defendants submitted false claims] has contr ol over 
government funds for the purpose of pr operly reimbursing 
a non-fraudulent party, and the suit is filed because the 
funds wind up in the hands of an improper claimant." 
Hutchins I, slip. op. at *4. The District Court noted that the 
Bankruptcy Court, as intermediary, did not have similar 
control over the funds. Permitting this claim, said the 
District Court, would mean the False Claims Act would 
"apply whenever an individual submits a gover nment- 
approved false claim to a third party who happens to owe 
an unrelated debt to a government agency." Id. at *4-5. 
 
In its amicus curiae brief, the gover nment contends the 
District Court improperly implied that a False Claims Act 
plaintiff who alleges the defendant caused an intermediary 
to submit a false claim on its behalf must establish that the 
intermediary had control over the gover nment funds. To the 
extent the District Court's opinion implies an "intermediary 
control" requirement, we agr ee with the government that 
the District Court erred. The proper inquiry under the False 
Claims Act is not whether an intermediary controls 
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government funds for any period of time but whether the 
defendant causes, or will cause, the intermediary to make 
a false claim against the government r esulting in a financial 
loss to the treasury. See, e.g., Neifert-White Co., 390 U.S. at 
233; Rainwater, 356 U.S. at 591. Several cases recognize 
that a plaintiff may assert a cause of action under the False 
Claims Act even when an intermediary, such as a 
subcontractor, is merely a conduit to the transfer of 
government funds. See, e.g., Bor nstein, 423 U.S. at 309; 
United States v. Ueber, 299 F.2d 310, 313 (6th Cir. 1962). 
The intermediary need not have discretion over, or even 
possession of, the government funds to establish that the 
defendant violated the False Claims Act. Ther efore, we 
reiterate that the proper inquiry under the False Claims Act 
is whether the defendant made fraudulent claims that 
caused economic loss to the United States Tr easury. 
 
D. 
 
On appeal, Hutchins contends Wilentz, Goldman & 
Spitzer's submission of fraudulent legal bills to the 
Bankruptcy Court constitutes a reverse false claim in 
violation of S 3729(a)(7). He argues that if the government 
were a creditor to a bankrupt estate, it would suffer 
"economic loss" by reason of the estate paying inflated legal 
bills. 
 
The False Claims Act recognizes that a party may be 
liable for a reverse false claim if he "knowingly makes, uses, 
or causes to be made or used, a false recor d or statement 
to conceal, avoid, or decrease an obligation to pay or 
transmit money or property to the Gover nment." 31 U.S.C. 
S 3729(a)(7). But in his complaint, Hutchins never asserted 
a reverse false claim cause of action under 31 U.S.C. 
S 3729(a)(7), nor did he allege the gover nment was a 
creditor in any of the bankrupt estates in which Wilentz, 
Goldman & Spitzer submitted inflated legal bills. 
 
As noted, the District Court dismissed Hutchins's claim 
on a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion. Our r eview therefore is 
limited to reviewing the claims alleged in his complaint.6 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. See, e.g., Mahone v. Addicks Utility Dist. of Harris County, 836 F.2d 
921, 935 (5th Cir. 1988) ("It is black-letter law that `[a] motion to 
dismiss 
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Because Hutchins did not plead this cause of action, nor 
file a motion to amend his complaint to raise this cause of 
action, we will not address his reverse false claim argument 
on appeal. 
 
IV. 
 
Hutchins also alleges that Wilentz, Goldman & Spitzer 
fired him in retaliation for his investigation and reporting of 
fraud in violation of 31 U.S.C. S 3730(h). Section 3730(h) 
provides: 
 
       Any employee who is discharged, demoted, suspended, 
       threatened, harassed, or in any other manner 
       discriminated against in the terms and conditions of 
       employment by his or her employer because of lawful 
       acts done by the employee on behalf of the employee or 
       others in furtherance of an action under this section, 
       including investigation for, initiating of, testimony for, 
       or assistance in an action filed or to be filed under this 
       section, shall be entitled to all relief necessary to make 
       the employee whole. 
 
This so called "whistleblower" provision protects 
employees who assist the government in the investigation 
and prosecution of violations of the False Claims Act. Neal 
v. Honeywell Inc., 33 F.3d 860, 861 (7th Cir. 1994). 
Congress enacted S 3730(h) "to encourage any individuals 
knowing of Government fraud to bring that information 
forward." S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 4 (1986), reprinted in 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266. "[F]ew individuals will expose fraud if 
they fear their disclosures will lead to harassment, 
demotion, loss of employment or any other for m of 
retaliation." Id. at 5300. Ther efore, S 3730(h) broadly 
protects employees who assist the gover nment in 
prosecuting and investigating False Claims Act violations. 
 
A plaintiff asserting a cause of action underS 3730(h) 
must show (1) he engaged in "protected conduct," (i.e., acts 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
for failure to state claim under Federal Rule Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is 
to 
be evaluated only on the pleadings.' ") (quoting Jackson v. Procunier, 789 
F.2d 307, 309 (5th Cir. 1986)); see also 5A Charles Alan Wright and 
Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Pr ocedure S 1356 (2d ed. 1990). 
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done in furtherance of an action under S 3730) and (2) that 
he was discriminated against because of his "pr otected 
conduct." United States ex rel. Y esudian v. Howard Univ., 
153 F.3d 731, 736 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (quoting S. Rep. No. 99- 
345, at 35 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5300). In 
proving that he was discriminated against "because of " 
conduct in furtherance of a False Claims Act suit, a plaintiff 
must show that (1) his employer had knowledge he was 
engaged in "protected conduct"; and (2) that his employer's 
retaliation was motivated, at least in part, by the 
employee's engaging in "protected conduct."7 Id.; see also 
Zahodnick v. Int'l Bus. Machines Corp., 135 F .3d 911, 914 
(4th Cir. 1997). At that point, the bur den shifts to the 
employer to prove the employee would have been 
terminated even if he had not engaged in the protected 
conduct. Mikes v. Strauss, 889 F. Supp. 746, 754 (S.D.N.Y. 
1995). 
 
At issue here is whether Hutchins engaged in"protected 
conduct," and whether Wilentz, Goldman & Spitzer was on 
notice that he was pursuing (i.e., acting in furtherance of) 
a False Claims Act suit and retaliated against him. 
Hutchins claims he engaged in three activities that were 
"protected conduct" that put his employer on notice that he 
was investigating and pursuing a potential False Claims Act 
suit. First, he cites the memorandum he wrote to Louis 
DeLucia concerning the law firm's"practice" of 
overcharging clients for Westlaw and LEXIS research costs. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The requirement that employers have knowledge that an employee is 
engaged in "protected conduct" ensur es that S 3730(h) suits are only 
prosecuted where there has been actual retaliation. Robertson v. Bell 
Helicopter Textron, Inc., 32 F.3d 948, 951 (5th Cir. 1994) (quoting S. 
Rep. 
No. 99-345, at 5 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5300), cert. 
denied, 513 U.S. 1154 (1995). As the Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit has noted, knowledge on the part of the employer is necessary 
because, 
 
       Some employees will cry "fraud" to make pests of themselves, in the 
       hope of being bought off with higher salaries or more desirable 
       assignments. Others will perceive the disappointments of daily life 
       as "retaliation" and file suits that have some settlement value 
       because of the high costs of litigation and the possibility of 
error. 
 
Neal, 33 F.3d at 863. 
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Second, he points to his inquiry to Marie Henneberry, the 
paralegal supervisor, about this billing practice as well as 
the practice of using paralegals to perfor m secretarial 
functions resulting in inflated client bills. Finally, he cites 
his request for billing documents from the accounting 
department. 
 
In granting defendant's motion for summary judgment, 
the District Court found Hutchins failed to engage in 
"protected conduct" and that Wilentz, Goldman & Spitzer 
was not on notice of potential False Claims Act litigation 
when it fired him. The court found Hutchins's investigation 
and reporting of the Westlaw and LEXIS billing practice was 
not "protected conduct" because, 
 
       plaintiff only looked into the firm's research costs 
       because his supervisor, defendant DeLucia, asked him 
       to. The memo and all research involved, was therefore, 
       the product of a specific assignment given to him by 
       his supervisor. It was not the result of plaintiff 's 
       independent investigation prompted by a suspicion of 
       fraud upon the government. 
 
Hutchins II, slip. op. at *13. Additionally, the court stated, 
 
       [T]he record is clear that at no point did plaintiff 
       complain or express any objection to the fir m's alleged 
       policy of inflating research costs. He merely performed 
       the limited billing research his supervisor asked of 
       him, wrote his findings down in an inter office memo, 
       and submitted it to DeLucia. 
 
Id. at *15. Finally the court stated, 
 
       [Hutchins] fail[ed] to establish facts that demonstrate 
       he alerted his employer, or acted so as to put it on 
       notice, that he was investigating alleged wr ongdoings 
       and might be reporting them. Plaintiff 's assertions that 
       he knew about unlawful practices, standing alone, 
       without facts to support a finding that defendantfired 
       him in retaliation for investigating and possibly 
       reporting what he discovered, do not constitute enough 
       evidence to support his federal claim in this action. 
 
Id. at *16. 
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A. 
 
An employee must engage in "protected conduct" in order 
to assert a claim under S 3730(h). In addr essing what 
activities constitute "protected conduct," the "case law 
indicates that `protected [conduct]' r equires a nexus with 
the `in furtherance of ' prong of [a False Claims Act] action." 
McKenzie v. Bellsouth Telecomm., Inc., 219 F.3d 508, 515 
(6th Cir. 2000). This inquiry involves deter mining "whether 
[plaintiff 's] actions sufficiently furthered `an action filed or 
to be filed under' the [False Claims Act] and, thus, equate 
to `protected [conduct].' " Id. at 516. Section 3730(h) 
specifies that "protected conduct" includes "investigation 
for, initiating of, testimony for, or assistance in" a False 
Claims Act suit. 31 U.S.C. S 3730(h). 
 
Determining what activities constitute "pr otected 
conduct" is a fact specific inquiry. But the case law 
indicates that "the protected conduct element . . . does not 
require the plaintiff to have developed a winning qui tam 
action . . . . It only requires that the plaintiff engage[ ] in 
`acts . . . in furtherance of an action under[the False 
Claims Act].' " Yesudian, 153 F.3d at 739 (quoting 31 U.S.C. 
S 3730(h)). Under the appropriate set of facts, these 
activities can include internal reporting and investigation of 
an employer's false or fraudulent claims. Id. at 742 ("[It] 
would [not] . . . be in the interest of law-abiding employers 
for the [False Claims Act] to force employees to report their 
concerns outside the corporation in or der to gain 
whistleblower protection. Such a requir ement would bypass 
internal controls and hotlines, damage corporate efforts at 
self-policing, and make it difficult for corporations and 
boards of directors to discover and corr ect on their own 
false claims made by rogue employees or managers."); see 
also Childree v. UAP/GA Chem, Inc., 92 F .3d 1140, 1146 
(11th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1148 (1997); 
Hopper, 91 F.3d at 1269 ("[P]laintiff must be investigating 
matters which are calculated, or reasonably could lead to a 
viable [False Claims Act] action."); Neal, 33 F.3d at 864. 
"Mere dissatisfaction with one's treatment on the job is not, 
of course, enough. Nor is an employee's investigation of 
nothing more than his employer's non-compliance with 
federal or state regulations." Y esudian, 153 F.3d at 740 
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(citing Hopper, 91 F.3d at 1269); see also Zahodnick, 135 
F.3d at 914 ("Simply reporting his concern of a mischarging 
to the government to his supervisor does not suffice to 
establish that Zahodnick was acting `in furtherance of ' a 
qui tam action."); United States ex r el. Ramseyer v. Century 
Healthcare Corp., 90 F.3d 1514, 1523 (10th Cir. 1996). 
 
As noted, employees need not actually file a False Claims 
Act suit to assert a cause of action under S 3730. Requiring 
an employee to actually file a qui tam suit would blunt the 
incentive to investigate and report activity that may lead to 
viable False Claims Act suits. The False Claims Act was 
enacted to encourage parties to report fraudulent activity 
and was intended to "protect employees while they are 
collecting information about a possible fraud, before they 
have put all the pieces of the puzzle together ." Yesudian, 
153 F.3d at 740 (citing Neal, 33 F .3d at 864). 
 
B. 
 
As noted, the False Claims Act also requir es employees to 
prove they were discriminated against"because of " their 
"protected conduct." To meet this r equirement, a plaintiff 
must show his employer had knowledge that he was 
engaged in "protected conduct" and that the employer 
retaliated against him because of that conduct. Several 
courts of appeals have held that the knowledge pr ong of 
S 3730 liability requires the employee to put his employer 
on notice of the "distinct possibility" of False Claims Act 
litigation. Yesudian, 153 F.3d at 740; Childree, 92 F.3d at 
1146; Hopper, 91 F.3d at 1269; Neal, 33 F.3d at 864. We 
agree with this formulation. 
 
An employer's notice of the "distinct possibility" of False 
Claims Act litigation is essential because without knowledge 
an employee is contemplating a False Claims Act suit, 
"there would be no basis to conclude that the employer 
harbored [S 3730(h)'s] prohibited motivation [i.e., 
retaliation]." Mann v. Olsten Certified Healthcare Corp., 49 
F. Supp.2d 1307, 1314 (M.D. Ala. 1999). Courts have 
recognized "the kind of knowledge the [employer] must have 
mirrors the kind of activity in which the [employee] must be 
engaged. What [the employer] must know is that[the 
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employee] is engaged in protected activity .. . -- that is, in 
activity that reasonably could lead to a False Claims Act 
case."8 Yesudian , 153 F.3d at 742. 
 
"Merely grumbling to the employer about job 
dissatisfaction or regulatory violations does not satisfy the 
requirement - just as it does not constitute protected 
conduct in the first place." Id. at 743. As one court has 
stated, the inquiry into whether an employee puts his 
employer on notice is 
 
       [w]hether the employee engaged in conduct fr om which 
       a fact finder could reasonably conclude that the 
       employer could have feared that the employee was 
       contemplating filing a qui-tam action against it or 
       reporting the employer to the government for fraud 
       . . . . [L]itigation . . . [is] a "distinct possibility" only if 
       the evidence reasonably supports such fear; if the 
       evidence does not support this fear, litigation would not 
       have been a distinct possibility. 
 
Mann, 49 F. Supp.2d at 1314; see also McKenzie, 219 F.3d 
at 514-15; Yesudian, 153 F.3d at 741-45; Neal, 33 F.3d at 
863-865. 
 
Whether an employer is on notice of the "distinct 
possibility" of False Claims Act litigation is also a fact 
specific inquiry. While "[a]n employer is entitled to treat a 
suggestion for improvement as what it purports to be rather 
than as a precursor to litigation," Luckey v. Baxter 
Healthcare Corp., 183 F.3d 730, 733 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 
528 U.S. 1038 (1999), the employer is on notice of the 
"distinct possibility" of litigation when an employee takes 
actions revealing the intent to report or assist the 
government in the investigation of a False Claims Act 
violation. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. We note that the "protected conduct" and notice requirements are 
separate elements of a prima facie case of r etaliation under S 3730. But 
as several circuits have recognized, the inquiry into these elements 
involves a similar analytical and factual investigation. See, e.g., 
Yesudian, 153 F.3d at 742. 
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C. 
 
1. 
 
In most retaliation cases under S 3730(h), the two critical 
questions are (1) what sort of activity constitutes "protected 
conduct," and (2) whether the employer was on notice that 
the employee was engaging in "protected conduct."9 
Because the inquiry into these questions is intensely 
factual, we will examine reported cases that r eview whether 
an employee engaged in "protected conduct" and whether 
this conduct was sufficiently linked to the investigation of 
a False Claims Act suit that it put the employer on notice 
of the "distinct possibility" of litigation. 
 
In Neal, 33 F.3d 860, an employee who worked at the 
Joliet Army Arsenal Plant concluded her co-workers were 
falsifying ammunition test data reports. She r eported this 
activity to her supervisor and to her employer's office of 
legal counsel. The employer's legal counsel then notified the 
United States Army which conducted an investigation and 
found plaintiff 's fraud allegations wer e true. The Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found the plaintiff engaged 
in "protected conduct" and put her employer on notice of 
the "distinct possibility" of False Claims Act litigation when 
she reported the fraud to her employer's legal counsel. 
Specifically, the court noted that plaintif f "conducted her 
own investigation and reported her findings through 
corporate channels, leading to two additional investigations: 
one by [the defendant] and a second by the Ar my." Id. at 
865. 
 
In Yesudian, 153 F.3d 731, the Court of Appeals for the 
D.C. Circuit found an employee of Howar d University who 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. As noted a prima facie case of retaliation under S 3730 requires proof 
that the plaintiff (1) engaged in "pr otected conduct," (i.e., acts done 
in 
furtherance of an action under S 3730) and (2) that the plaintiff 's 
employer discriminated him because of his "pr otected conduct." In 
proving that he was discriminated against "because of " his activities in 
furtherance of a False Claims Act suit, a plaintif f must show that (1) 
his 
employer had knowledge that he was engaged in "pr otected conduct"; 
and (2) that his employer's retaliation was motivated, at least in part, 
by 
the plaintiff 's engaging in "pr otected conduct." 
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worked in the purchasing department engaged in"protected 
conduct" when he reported to upper-level University 
officials that his supervisor was engaged in fraudulent 
activity. The plaintiff reported, among other things, that his 
supervisor submitted false time and attendance r ecords, 
received bribes from vendors, and made payments to 
vendors who did not provide services to the University. The 
court held the plaintiff engaged in "pr otected conduct" and 
put the University on notice of the "distinct possibility" of a 
False Claims Act suit because he repeatedly advised his 
superiors that he had evidence of false recor ds. He wrote 
several letters to his supervisors and to the University 
President and Vice-President detailing what he believed was 
illegal conduct that fraudulently resulted in the loss of 
government money. He also collected evidence from 
employees to corroborate his claims and took photographs 
of evidence. The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Cir cuit held 
these reporting actions put the University administration, 
and plaintiff 's immediate supervisors, on notice of the 
"distinct possibility" of False Claims Act litigation. Id. at 
744-45; see also Hopkins v. Actions, Incorp. of Brazoria 
County, 985 F.Supp. 706, 709-10 (S.D.T ex. 1997) (holding 
plaintiff who reported to chairman of company that 
employees were illegally using Medicare funds for payroll 
costs, as well as informed him that she intended to report 
this activity to the government, engaged in"protected 
conduct" that put employer on notice of the "distinct 
possibility" of litigation). 
 
Not all complaints by employees to their supervisors put 
employers on notice of the "distinct possibility" of False 
Claims Act litigation. In Robertson, 32 F .3d 948, the Court 
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found an employee did not 
engage in "protected conduct" nor did he put his employer 
on notice of potential False Claims Act litigation when he 
reported to his supervisors that the company was billing 
the government for various helicopter pr ojects without 
properly substantiating the charges. The court noted the 
plaintiff "never used the terms `illegal,' `unlawful' or `qui tam 
action' in characterizing his concerns about[the] charges." 
Id. at 951; see also Mann, 49 F.Supp.2d at 1307. 
 
In Zahodnick, 135 F.3d 911, the Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit found a managing engineer at IBM whose 
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job duties included assembling cost information for 
proposals to the Defense Intelligence Agency did not engage 
in "protected conduct" and failed to put his employer on 
notice of the "distinct possibility" of a False Claims Act suit. 
In Zahodnick, plaintiff engineer r eported to his supervisor 
that employees were overcharging the government for the 
amount of time they worked on government pr ojects. The 
court stated, 
 
       The record discloses that Zahodnick mer ely informed a 
       supervisor of the problem and sought confir mation that 
       a correction was made; he never informed anyone that 
       he was pursuing a qui tam action. Simply r eporting his 
       concern of mischarging to the gover nment to his 
       supervisor does not establish that Zahodnick was 
       acting "in furtherance of " a qui tam  action. 
 
Id. at 914 (citing Robertson, 32 F .3d at 951). 
 
Last year in McKenzie, 219 F.3d 508, the Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held a dispatcher for 
BellSouth, whose regular job duties included pr ocessing 
complaints about telephone service and closing "trouble 
reports" once telephone repairs wer e made, did not engage 
in "protected conduct" nor put her employer on notice of 
potential False Claims Act litigation when she complained 
to her supervisors that BellSouth was falsifying r eports. It 
was BellSouth's policy that if repairs wer e not made within 
twenty-four hours of being reported, the customer was 
entitled to a refund for the period of time that telephone 
service was disrupted. Plaintiff alleged that various 
employees falsified time reports when outages were 
reported and when repairs were completed so that 
BellSouth could avoid paying reimbursements to 
customers, including several government agencies. Plaintiff 
complained to her supervisors about this practice and on 
one occasion showed her supervisor a newspaper article 
about a consumer fraud investigation by the Florida state 
attorney general. She also refused to falsify repair records. 
The court found the plaintiff did not engage in "protected 
conduct" reasoning that "when McKenzie br ought her 
complaints to the attention of the BellSouth auditor and 
her supervisors, legal action was not a reasonable or 
distinct possibility . . . because [her complaints were] not 
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sufficiently connected to exposing fraud or false claims 
against the federal government." Id.  at 516-17. The court 
stated the newspaper article McKenzie showed her 
supervisor "did not relate to a qui tam  action and only 
discussed a consumer fraud investigation by the Florida 
state attorney general." Id. at 518. Additionally, the article 
was widely circulated and disseminated thr oughout the 
office. The court also reasoned that "although the 
newspaper article distributed and posted by McKenzie 
shows awareness of consumer fraud, the `in furtherance of ' 
language requires more than mer ely reporting wrongdoing 
to supervisors." Id. at 516. The court stated that McKenzie's 
"numerous complaints on the matter wer e directed at the 
stress from and pressure to falsify records, not toward an 
investigation into fraud on the federal gover nment." Id. at 
517. Therefore, McKenzie did not put BellSouth on notice of 
the "distinct possibility" that she might pursue a False 
Claims Act suit or inform the government that BellSouth's 
fraudulent conduct was causing an economic loss to the 
government. 
 
These cases are illustrative of the general rule that a 
successful cause of action under S 3730 r equires an 
employee to prove that he engaged in "pr otected conduct," 
that is conduct in furtherance of a False Claims Act suit, 
and that his employer was on notice of the "distinct 
possibility" of False Claims Act litigation and r etaliated 
against him because of his "protected conduct." As noted, 
this is a fact specific inquiry. 
 
2. 
 
Although reporting "fraudulent" and "illegal" activity to an 
employer may satisfy the "protected conduct" and notice 
requirements in many S 3730(h) cases, in some instances 
where an employee's job duties involve investigating and 
reporting fraud, the employee's burden of proving he 
engaged in "protected conduct" and put his employer on 
notice of the "distinct possibility" of False Claims Act 
litigation is heightened. As the Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit held in Eberhar dt v. Integrated Design & 
Constr., Inc., 167 F.3d 861, 868 (4th Cir. 1999), "If an 
employee is assigned the task of investigating fraud within 
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the company, courts have held that the employee must 
make it clear that the employee's actions go beyond the 
assigned task [in order to allege retaliatory discharge under 
S 3730(h)]." The court stated that when an employee is 
assigned the task of investigating fraud, "such persons 
must make clear their intentions of bringing or assisting in 
a [False Claims Act] action in order to overcome the 
presumption that they are merely acting in accordance with 
their employment obligations." Id. This r equirement is 
consistent with the understanding that the employer must 
be put on notice that the employee is contemplating a 
potential False Claims Act suit before liability will attach 
under S 3730(h). 
 
In Ramseyer, 90 F.3d at 1523, the Court of Appeals for 
the Tenth Circuit found a plaintif f who was the clinical 
director of a mental health facility, whose r esponsibilities 
included monitoring compliance with applicable Medicaid 
requirements, did not engage in "pr otected conduct" when 
she reported to her superiors that the facility was not 
complying with various Medicaid requirements. The court 
reasoned that these reports to her supervisors, without 
more, did not put defendants on notice of a potential qui 
tam suit because the reporting was part of plaintiff 's job 
duties. The court stated, 
 
       Plaintiff never suggested to defendants that she 
       intended to utilize [their] non compliance in 
       furtherance of a [False Claims Act] action. Plaintiff gave 
       no suggestion that she was going to report such 
       noncompliance to government officials, nor did she 
       provide any indication that she was contemplating her 
       own qui tam action. Rather, the monitoring and 
       reporting activities described in plaintif f 's complaint 
       [i.e., reporting to her superiors] wer e exactly those 
       activities plaintiff was required to undertake in 
       fulfillment of her job duties, and plaintif f took no steps 
       to put defendants on notice that she was acting"in 
       furtherance of " a [False Claims Act ] action. 
 
Id. at 1523 (internal citations omitted). 
 
In Robertson, 32 F.3d at 952, the Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit held a senior contract administrator with the 
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Army Helicopter Improvement Program, who was 
responsible for ensuring that costs wer e properly charged to 
the government and requests for additional government 
funding were properly substantiated, did not engage in 
"protected conduct" when he reported to his superiors that 
certain requests for additional government funding were not 
properly substantiated. In Robertson, plaintiff investigated 
and tried to verify the requests for funding and over the 
course of several months reported his findings to his 
superiors. The court found this activity was not pr otected 
because plaintiff " `did nothing to r ebut his supervisor's 
testimony regarding their lack of knowledge that he was 
conducting investigations outside the scope of his job 
responsibilities in furtherance of a qui tam action.' " Id. 
(quoting district court opinion). The court r easoned that 
plaintiff "never characterized his concer ns as involving 
illegal, unlawful, or false-claims investigations . . . . [There 
is] no evidence that [plaintiff] expr essed any concerns to his 
superiors other than those typically raised as part of a 
contract administrator's job." Id. 
 
Even though an employee's job duties include 
investigating or reporting fraud, the employee may still 
engage in "protected conduct" and put his employer on 
notice of the "distinct possibility" of False Claims Act 
litigation. In Eberhardt, 167 F .3d at 868, the Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit stated an employee can put 
his employer on notice 
 
       by expressly stating an intention to bring a qui tam 
       suit, . . . [or by engaging in] any action which a fact 
       finder reasonably could conclude would put the 
       employer on notice that litigation is a reasonable 
       possibility. Such actions would include, but ar e not 
       limited to, characterizing the employer's conduct as 
       illegal or fraudulent or recommending that legal 
       counsel become involved. These types of actions ar e 
       sufficient because they let the employer know, 
       regardless of whether the employee's job duties include 
       investigating potential fraud, that litigation is a 
       reasonable possibility. 
 
In Eberhardt, 167 F.3d at 868, a senior staff vice- 
president whose job duties included organizing his 
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employer's accounting system engaged in "pr otected 
conduct" and put his employer on notice of the"distinct 
possibility" of False Claims Act litigation when he began 
investigating his employer's charges to the United States 
State Department for work not actually perfor med. 
Although plaintiff 's job duties required him to investigate 
fraud, the court found he engaged in "protected conduct." 
The court reasoned plaintiff reported to his employer that 
the charges were "illegal." Id.  Additionally, he informed his 
employer that it was advisable to obtain legal counsel. The 
court concluded these activities were sufficient to put his 
employer on notice of potential False Claims Act litigation. 
Id.; see also Mann, 49 F. Supp.2d at 1316 (employee whose 
job duties included reporting and investigating compliance 
with Medicare regulations did not put employer on notice of 
False Claims Act litigation when she reported billing 
overcharges to supervisor because this r eporting was part 
of her regular job duties, however when she r eported this 
information to her employer's legal department she engaged 
in protected conduct). 
 
D. 
 
We fail to see how Hutchins engaged in "pr otected 
conduct." Similarly, we do not believe that W ilentz, 
Goldman & Spitzer was on notice of the "distinct 
possibility" of False Claims Act litigation and r etaliated 
against Hutchins because of his "protected conduct." 
Hutchins never threatened to report his discovery of the 
firm's Westlaw and LEXIS billing practices to a government 
authority, nor did he file a False Claims Act suit until after 
he was terminated. Childree, 92 F.3d at 1146. Furthermore, 
Hutchins never informed his supervisors he believed this 
billing practice was "illegal," Ramseyer , 90 F.3d at 1523, or 
that the practice was fraudulently causing gover nment 
funds to be lost or spent. Robertson, 32 F .3d at 951. Nor 
did he advise his employer that corporate counsel be 
involved in the matter. Eberhardt, 167 F.3d at 869. Rather, 
in a single memorandum he stated, "I was told thefirm has 
a policy whereby actual Westlaw and LEXIS expenses are 
multiplied by 1.5 in order to arrive at the amount the client 
is invoiced for." As held in Zahodnick , 135 F.3d at 914, 
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"simply reporting [a] concern of mischarging . . . does not 
establish that [plaintiff] was acting in furtherance of a qui 
tam action." Hutchins's memorandum mer ely stated, as a 
matter of fact, the firm's policy of passing on Westlaw 
charges to clients. The memorandum did not inform 
Wilentz, Goldman & Spitzer that he intended to use this 
information in furtherance of a qui tam  action or that he 
was going to report it to government authorities because he 
believed the law firm was defrauding the government. 
Robertson, 32 F.3d at 952; Mikes, 889 F. Supp. at 753 
(plaintiff must show employer was on notice that she was 
"laying the groundwork for legal action"). 
 
Nor did Hutchins's complaint to Marie Henneberry about 
the practice of paralegals performing secretarial tasks put 
the law firm on notice of the "distinct possibility" of False 
Claims Act litigation. Hutchins approached Henneberry 
only to "confirm basically that [another paralegal] had 
talked to her about [using paralegals for secr etarial tasks]," 
never advising Henneberry that he thought the practice was 
illegal or fraudulently causing loss of gover nment funds.10 
Similar to the plaintiff in Zahodnick, Hutchins "merely 
informed a supervisor of a problem and sought 
confirmation that a correction was made." 135 F.3d at 914. 
As held in Luckey, "An employer is entitled to treat a 
suggestion for improvement as what it purports to be rather 
than a precursor to litigation." 183 F .3d at 733. Because 
Hutchins's single discussion with Henneberry did not allege 
fraud, illegality or a potential False Claims Act suit, we fail 
to see how the conversation put Wilentz, Goldman & 
Spitzer on notice of the "distinct possibility" of False Claims 
Act litigation. McKenzie, 219 F.3d at 516 (plaintiff "must 
sufficiently allege activity with a nexus to a qui tam action, 
or fraud against the United States Government"). 
 
Hutchins claims that aside from his "r eporting" (the 
memorandum to DeLucia and his conversation with 
Henneberry), he was involved in the initial investigation of 
a potential False Claims Act suit. See Y esudian, 153 F.3d at 
740 (Section 3730(h) "protect[s] employees while they are 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Hutchins told Henneberry that he thought the practice was 
"unethical." 
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collecting information about a possible fraud, before they 
have put all the pieces of the puzzle together ."). He 
contends his discussion with Marie Henneberry about the 
Westlaw and LEXIS charges and his r equest for billing 
documents from the accounting department constituted 
"investigation" that put Wilentz, Goldman & Spitzer on 
notice of the "distinct possibility" of False Claims Act 
litigation. We disagree. 
 
Hutchins's "investigation" was in response to a specific 
assignment from Louis DeLucia who asked him to 
determine why certain clients' computerized r esearch costs 
were so high. Hutchins's inquiry to Henneberry about the 
practice was not the result of his independent suspicions 
that the firm was involved in fraud. As held in Eberhardt, 
167 F.3d at 868, if an employee is assigned the task of 
investigating fraud within the company, that employee 
must make it clear that his investigatory and r eporting 
activities extend beyond the assigned task in or der to allege 
retaliatory discharge under S 3730(h). We see no evidence 
that Hutchins engaged in any conduct, beyond what was 
specifically asked of him in accordance with his job duties, 
that gave any indication that he was investigating fraud for 
a potential False Claims Act suit. He did not communicate 
that he was going to report the activity to government 
officials nor that he was contemplating his own qui tam 
suit. Robertson, 32 F.3d at 952. He did not use the terms 
"illegal" or "fraud" nor did he attempt to discuss the billing 
practice with corporate counsel. Eberhar dt, 167 F.3d at 
869; Neal, 33 F.3d at 865. Rather , he merely performed the 
task he was asked to complete by his supervisor . Ramseyer, 
90 F.3d at 1523; Mann, 49 F. Supp.2d at 1316. 
 
Hutchins contends his "investigation" into W estlaw and 
LEXIS billing was not part of his job duties. He ar gues that 
unlike the plaintiffs in Robertson, Ramseyer and Eberhardt, 
his job description as a paralegal did not contain 
"monitoring or reporting" activities, nor was he a "fraud 
investigator." Nonetheless, his inquiry into the Westlaw and 
LEXIS billing was in furtherance of his job duties. Because 
he performed the investigation at the direct request of his 
supervisor, there was no reason to believe that Hutchins 
would use the information he obtained to bring a qui tam 
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suit. Eberhardt, 167 F.3d 868 ("[An] employee must make it 
clear that [his] actions go beyond the assigned task."); 
Robertson, 32 F.3d at 952 (employee not engaged in 
"protected conduct" because his "actions were consistent 
with the performance of his [job] duty"). 
 
As S 3730(h) makes clear, without notice of an employee's 
intent to file or assist in a False Claims Act suit, an 
employer does not engage in prohibited r etaliatory conduct 
under S 3730(h) when it terminates or demotes that 
employee. McKenzie, 219 F.3d at 516. Here, Wilentz, 
Goldman & Spitzer was not on notice that Hutchins was 
contemplating a qui tam suit. Regardless of his job 
description, Hutchins's "investigation" into the firm's billing 
practice resulted from a direction fr om his employer. 
 
Finally, we do not believe Hutchins's request for billing 
documents from the accounting department was pr otected 
investigatory conduct that put the law fir m on notice of the 
"distinct possibility" of False Claims Act litigation and 
therefore evidence that the law fir m retaliated against him. 
As the record makes clear, W ilentz, Goldman & Spitzer 
decided to fire Hutchins before he r equested these 
documents. Because the law firm was unawar e of 
Hutchins's request for these documents when it decided to 
fire him, it did not retaliate against him in violation of 
S 3730(h) because of his "investigation" into the firm's 
accounting files. 
 
Hutchins has failed to assert a prima facie case of 
retaliatory discharge under S 3730(h). By failing to prove 
that he engaged in "protected conduct" and that he put his 
employer on notice of the "distinct possibility" of False 
Claims Act litigation, Hutchins, as a matter of law, cannot 
prove a violation of S 3730(h). W e agree with the District 
Court that Wilentz, Goldman & Spitzer did not terminate 
Hutchins in retaliation for his "investigation" in furtherance 
of a False Claims Act suit. 
 
V. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affir m the District 
Court's dismissal of Hutchins's qui tam claims. We also will 
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affirm its grant of summary judgment for W ilentz, Goldman 
& Spitzer on the retaliatory discharge claims. 
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